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Deceptive Conduct: Recognising a Further Typology of Abuse under s. 76 
 
Introduction  
Following the introduction of s. 76 Serious Crime Act 2015 this is a timely opportunity to 
explore the concept of deceptive conduct as a form of criminally controlling behaviour. The 
offence created under s. 76 applies to coercive or controlling behaviour that has a serious 
effect on the complainant and takes place in an intimate or familial relationship. The terms 
coercive and controlling are not defined within the legislation, however, the policy 
definition adopted in England and Wales illustrates that both are understood to capture a 
wide range of ongoing activity. It is recognised that abuse in an intimate relationship, occurs 
particularly where there is an ongoing pattern of submission by one party and control by the 
other party, using a variety of methods.1 This article will consider the behaviour and harm 
associated with lying and deceiving applying a moral framework using Kantian ethics. The 
benefit of this Kantian approach is that it imposes a duty of care and trust between 
individuals and supports the view that both philosophically distinct concepts of lying and 
deceiving are capable and ought to be recognized as a form of abuse falling within 
controlling behaviour. Applying Kantian theory, it will be shown that lying and deceiving 
have a serious and adverse effect on the individual’s autonomy by impacting upon her 
decision-making process and influencing her will so that she is under the perpetrator’s 
control.  In addition, it will be shown that Kantian ethics imposes an obligation on the State 
to protect individuals from these forms of abuse within intimate relationships. This is 
                                                     
1 Gordon, M, ‘Definitional issues in violence against women: Surveillance and research from a violence 
research perspective’ (2000) 6 Violence Against Women 747 
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significant when considered in the context of discovered practices utilised by some 
undercover police officers who formed intimate relationships using false identities, with 
women as part of policing investigations. This example of lying and deception, it is argued, 
amounts to a form of controlling behaviour, extending beyond the perpetrating officers to 
include the state itself and furthering the degree of harm suffered by the victims. Based on 
the analysis provided in this article, it is advocated that any future use of such policing 
practices would amount to a criminal offence under s. 76 Serious Crime Act 2015. 
 
The socio-legal conceptualisations of domestic violence have traditionally focused on acts of 
physical violence.2 However, as the core elements of domestic violence were gradually 
understood as non-physical, they began to be described to include psychological abuse, or 
patriarchal or intimate terrorism.3 The term ‘coercive control’ is now more commonly used 
to describe conduct which does not exclusively include physical violence.4 One of the 
earliest definitions of this concept was provided by Stark and Flitcraft: 
[A] pattern of coercion characterized by the use of threats, intimidation, 
isolation, and emotional abuse, as well as a pattern of control over sexuality 
and social life, including… relationships with family and friends; material 
                                                     
2 Stark, E, Coercive Control: How Men Entrap Women In Personal Life, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2007); Laing, L, Cavanagh, K, and Humphreys, C, Social Work and Domestic Violence: Developing Critical and 
Reflective Practice, (London: Sage Publications, 2013) 
3 Johnson, M. P, A Typology of Domestic Violence: Intimate Terrorism, Violence, Resistance and Situational 
Couple Violence (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2008) 
4 Supra n 2 and n 3 
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resources (such as money food, or transportation); and various facets or 
everyday life (such as coming and going, shopping, cleaning, and so forth).5 
Thus, the long-term negative impacts of domestic violence on women’s economic, physical 
and mental health and the consequences for children and their life chances is indisputable 
within contemporary research.6 Widening the scope of domestic violence to include 
coercive control, has resulted in important policy and legal changes.7 In 2011 the definition 
of family violence in the Australian Family Law Act was expanded to incorporate notions of 
coercion and control (which are not always accompanied by physical violence or threats). 
Similarly, in England and Wales, s76, Serious Crimes Act 2015, criminalised coercive control 
in an intimate of family relationship.  
This article argues that lying and deceiving, in an intimate relationship, adversely affect a 
victim’s autonomy by limiting her choices and restricting her freedom. This type of conduct 
is capable of manipulating a victim’s decisions, preventing her from exercising autonomy in 
a manner which is consistent with her own standards, such as when and with whom to 
engage in an intimate relationship. According to Rubenfeld, ‘parties rarely disclose every 
potentially relevant detail’ about themselves to each other.8 Although this comment relates 
specifically to sexual relations, it can be applied equally to intimate relations. The variety of 
methods by which a perpetrator can tacitly mislead their victim includes purposely omitting 
information about finances or passing on personal messages. In the early stages of the 
relationship the perpetrator may deceive the victim about key aspects of their personal life 
                                                     
5 Stark, E, and Flitcraft, A, Women at risk: Domestic violence and women’s health (Thousand Oaks: CA: Sage 
1996), 166. 
6 Pitman, T, ‘Living with Coercive Control: Trapped within a Complex Web of Double Standards, Double Binds 
and Boundary Violations’ (2017) 47 British Journal of Social Work 143 at 144 
7 Ibid at 144 
8 Rubenfeld, J, ‘The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy’ (2013) 122 The Yale Law 
Journal 1372 at 1372. 
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for example through clothing, applying cosmetics, use of religious symbols and removing 
one’s wedding ring. Autonomy is violated where a perpetrator resorts to such deceptions to 
procure control over his victim, by limiting her freedom, knowing that his lying and 
deceiving related to a material fact. Withholding information relevant to an individual, such 
as the perpetrator’s identity, for the purpose of controlling a victim in an intimate 
relationship, is a violation of the victim’s autonomy.   
It will be argued that lying and deceiving should be classified as ‘controlling behaviour’ 
under the Serious Crimes Act 2015 (the Act), s 76.9  Section 76 creates the specific offence of 
‘controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship’ where the victim and 
the abuser are ‘personally connected’.10 This is not limited to where the perpetrator and the 
victim are in an ‘intimate relationship’ but where they live together and ‘they are members 
of the same family’,11 or ‘they have previously been in an intimate personal relationship 
with each other’.12 Thus, s76 addresses the gap in the law surrounding patterns of 
controlling or coercive behaviour which take place during a relationship between intimate 
partners, former partners who still live together or family members.13 The behaviour must 
have had a ‘serious effect’14 on V, meaning that it has caused her to fear violence will be 
used against her on ‘at least two occasions’,15 or it has had a ‘substantial adverse effect on 
the victims’ day to day activities’.16 However, a perpetrator must have known that their 
behaviour would have a serious effect on the victim, or the behaviour must have been such 
                                                     
9 Section 76 came into force on 29 December 2015. 
10 Section 76(2).  
11 Serious Crimes Act 2015, S 76(2)(b)(i) 
12 Serious Crimes Act 2015, S 76(2)(b)(ii) 
13 For discussion of the previous legislative gap in the law see Bettinson, V, and Bishop, C, ‘Is the creation of a 
discrete offence of coercive control necessary to combat domestic violence?’ (2015) NILQ 66, 179 
14 Serious Crimes Act 2015, S 76(1)(c) 
15 Serious Crimes Act 2015, S 76(4)(a) 
16 Serious Crimes Act 2015, S 76(4)(b) 
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that he or she ‘ought to have known’17 it would have that effect. Under s76(8) it is a defence 
to show that ‘in engaging in the behaviour in question, A believed that he… was acting in B's 
best interest’ and his ‘behaviour in all the circumstances was reasonable’.  
Controlling or coercive behaviour does not relate to a single incident, it is a purposeful 
pattern of behaviour which takes place over time designed for one individual to exert 
power, control or coercion over another.18 The cross-Government definition of domestic 
violence and abuse outlines controlling or coercive behaviour as follows:  
 Controlling behaviour is: a range of acts designed to make a person 
subordinate and/or dependent by isolating them from sources of support, 
exploiting their resources and capacities for personal gain, depriving them 
of the means needed for independence, resistance and escape and 
regulating their everyday behaviour.19  
Coercive behaviour is: a continuing act or a pattern of acts of assault, 
threats, humiliation and intimidation or other abuse that is used to harm, 
punish, or frighten their victim.20 
The definition is supported by an explanatory text: 
This definition, which is not a legal definition, includes so called 'honour' 
based violence, female genital mutilation (FGM) and forced marriage, and is 
clear that victims are not confined to one gender or ethnic group.21 
                                                     
17 Serious Crimes Act 2015, S 76(5) 
18 Home Office. Controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship: statutory guidance 
framework (Home Office, 2015) at 3 
19 Ibid at 3 
20 Ibid at 3 
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The question, therefore, is how to judge situations described above which take place in an 
intimate relationship? A moral theory must be capable of explaining why lying and deceiving 
should be considered as controlling behaviour. Liberal retributive principles require that 
only conduct which is blameworthy can legitimately be subject to state punishment.22 
Blameworthiness requires an individual to possess capacity for responsible agency. In other 
words, D knew what he was doing when he committed the offence under s76, and exercised 
choice and a sufficient degree of control in doing so.23 Blameworthiness, in the context of 
lying and deceiving, is analysed in terms of the harm caused to the victim and the 
wrongfulness of using lying and deception to control the victim’s behaviour. Harm deals 
with the degree to which the conduct causes, or risks causing a ‘significant setback to 
another’s interests’.24 Determining wrongfulness involves examining the extent to which the 
criminal act involves the violation of a moral norm.25 In the context of intimate 
relationships, it is not possible to violate a victim’s autonomy (wrongfulness), without 
causing her any harm. The argument in favour of including lying and deceiving as part of 
‘controlling behaviour’ is that such conduct should be understood as involving a violation of 
the victim’s autonomy.26 It is advocated that lying and deceiving are capable of causing 
harm to a victim by depriving her of independence and controlling her behaviour to the 
perpetrator’s advantage. According to Stark ‘[n]ot only is coercive control the most common 
context in which [women] are abused, it is also the most dangerous’.27 The Statutory 
                                                                                                                                                                     
21 Ibid at 3 
22 Green, P. S, ‘Lies, Rape, and Statutory Rape’ in Austin Sarat (ed), Law and Lies: Deception and Truth-Telling in 
the American Legal System (Cambridge University Press, 2015) at 205 
23 Lacey, N, and Packard, H, ‘To Blame or to Forgive? Reconciling Punishment and Forgiveness in Criminal 
Justice’ (2015) 35 OJLS 665  
24 Feinberg, J, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to Others (Oxford University Press, 1984) at 31-36 
25 Supra n 22 at 205 
26 McGregor, J, ‘Force, Consent, and the Reasonable Woman’ in J Coleman and A Buchanan (eds), Harm’s Way: 
Essays in Honour of Joel Feinberg (Cambridge University Press, 1994) at 231 
27 Supra n 2 
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Guidance provides a non-exhaustive list of types of behaviour associated with coercion or 
control.28 Amongst the types of behaviour, ‘isolating a person from their friends and family’ 
can be achieved by lying and deceiving. Examples include lying to the victim that her friends 
or family have contacted her or falsely informing her that her friends or family no longer 
wish to have any contact with her. Such behaviour includes deleting calls and messages 
from the victim’s phone.  
A Kantian framework will be applied to support the argument that lying and deceiving are a 
further type of abuse which should be criminalised under s76. Kant argued that the supreme 
principle of morality is a standard of rationality which he termed the ‘Categorical 
Imperative’ (CI).29 The CI has been described as ‘an objective, rationally necessary and 
unconditional principle’30 which must always be followed despite any desires or inclinations 
to the contrary.31 All specific moral requirements, according to Kant, are justified by this 
principle, which means that all immoral actions are irrational because they violate the CI.32 
Kant’s moral philosophy deals with ethical duties of the individual moral agent. The CI is 
based on ‘the Idea of the will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal law.’33 
A moral obligation must be universalised, in other words, capable of being applicable to all 
individuals, at all times and in similar situations.34 Therefore, Kant’s philosophy deals with 
ethical duties of the moral agent and the ability of the moral agent to act with moral 
rational agency.35 To be autonomous, an individual must be capable of independent moral 
                                                     
28 Supra n 18 at 4 
29Kant, I, The Moral Law: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals edited H J Paton (Routledge: London 
1966), 4:421 
30 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/    
31 Supra n 29 at 4:421 
32 Ibid at 4:421 
33 Ibid at 4:432 
34 Universalism in Ethics (2004)wwww.caae.phil.cmu.edu/Cavalier/80130/part2/Routledge/R_Deontology.html  
35 Supra n 29 at 4:431 93 
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judgment and decision-making and whose will is directed by their own moral conceptions 
and rational judgments, free from the influence of others.36 The appeal of Kantian ethics is 
its commitment to a moral obligation which must be universal and its consideration of 
whether the moral worth of an act is carried out as a result of a sense of duty or obligation. 
According to Kant, ‘all duties are either duties of right, that is, duties for which external law 
giving is possible, or duties of virtue, for which external lawgiving is not possible’.37 Kant’s 
principle of morality classifies duties into four categories: duties to oneself and others, and 
perfect and imperfect duties. Perfect duties are prohibitions of specific types of actions, and 
violating them is morally blameworthy. Imperfect duties are recommendations of certain 
acts, and adhering to them is morally praiseworthy. A crucial element of Kantian ethics to 
support the argument that lying and deceiving are capable of controlling an individual,  is his 
claim that a rational will cannot act except ‘under the Idea’ of its own freedom.38 Kant 
considers freedom to be the main value to individuals. Coercion is only permitted where it is 
essential to protect freedom. After first exploring the meaning of the terms lying and 
deceiving, the article will explore the impact of these behaviours upon a victim’s autonomy 
illustrating that such conduct restricts freedom and manipulates an individual, by depriving 
her of ‘the means needed for independence’. Used in this manner the behaviour amounts to 
controlling behaviour and ought to be construed as such for the purposes of criminalisation 
under s. 76.  
                                                     
36 Christman https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/  
37 Supra n 29 at 6:239 




Alexander and Sherwin describe deception as encompassing an unlimited variety of 
methods by which the deceiver creates false impressions in another’s mind.39 The term is 
used in this article to refer to the communication40 of a message41 that is intended to 
mislead.42 Deception, unlike lying, need not be directed at a specific individual. Examples of 
indirect deceptions include where the deceiver removes his wedding ring to mislead others 
about his marital status or where he gives the impression that he is a footballer or film 
producer.43 Deception includes actions, omissions, words and strategic silences.44 It is 
recognised that deception is an element of many forms of acceptable social behaviours, 
such as tact, politeness or evasion.45 In the context of intimate relationships, parties rarely 
disclose every potentially relevant detail.46 There are a variety of methods by which one can 
tacitly mislead. According to Adler, ‘deception need not be intentional or voluntary, as lying 
must’.47 However, he concedes that both lying and deception aim for the victim to believe 
falsely.48  
Lying  
Although a universally accepted definition of lying does not exist, Isenberg has suggested it 
is a ‘statement made by one who does not believe it with the intention that someone else 
                                                     
39 Alexander, L, and Sherwin, E, ‘Deception in Morality and Law’ (2003) 22 Law and Philosophy 393 at 400 
40 ‘Communication’ can be direct or indirect.   
41 Words and conduct.  
42 Green, P. S, Lying, Cheating, and Stealing: A Moral Theory of White-Collar Crime (Oxford University Press 
2007) at 76 
43 R v Melitti [2001] EWCA Crim 1563 
44 Supra n 39 at 400  
45 Adler, J, E, ‘Lying Deceiving, or Falsely Implicating’ (1997) 94 Journal of Philosophy 435 at 435 
46 Rubenfeld, J, ‘The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy’ (2013) 122 The Yale Law 
Journal 1372 at 1372 
47 Supra n 45 at 435  
48 Supra n 46 
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shall be led to believe it’.49 This definition requires further clarification to fully distinguish it 
from deception. Green has noted that lying involves a much narrower range of behaviours 
than deception generally.50  Deception, as shown above, includes a variety of methods by 
which the deceiver produces false impressions in another’s mind.51 Unlike deceptions, lies 
require an assertion that ‘we present ourselves as believing something while and through 
invoking (although not necessarily gaining) the trust of the one’ to whom we assert.52  
Lying is viewed as wrong for various reasons. Thomas Aquinas maintained that lying is 
contrary to the law of nature.53 Kant also viewed lying, which he defined as ‘false assertion’, 
to be ‘directly opposed to the natural purposiveness of the speaker’s capacity to 
communicate his thoughts’, and the liar ‘throws away and, as it were, annihilates his dignity 
as a human being’.54 Kant illustrates the absolute character of the moral imperative not to 
lie by giving the example of lying to the murderer at the door who asks about the 
whereabouts of his intended victim.55 Lying is wrong because it violates autonomy by 
forcing an individual to pursue the speaker's objectives, rather than her own preferences.56 
Lying asserts what the perpetrator believes to be false.57 Deceptions, on the other hand, are 
invitations by the perpetrator to accept as true his deceptive behaviour.58 In his treatment 
of the false promise case, under the Formula of Humanity, Kant explained that the victim of 
the lie would not agree to being used to the advantage of the false promisor and ‘cannot 
                                                     
49 Isenberg, A, ‘Deontology and the Ethics of Lying’ in  Callaghan, Cauman, L, W, Mothersill, S, et al (eds), 
Aesthetics and Theory of Criticism: Selected Essays of Arnold Isenberg (University of Chicago Press, 1973) at 
248; for an alternative definition see Alexander and Sherwin, supra at n 39 
50 Supra n 42 at 77 
51 Supra n 39 at 400. 
52 Simpson, D,  ’Lying, Liars and Language’ (1992) 52 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 623 at 625 
53 Aquinas, T, Summa Theologiae (McGraw-Hill, 1972, Vol. 4).  
54 Kant, I, The Metaphysics of Morals (Mary Gregor tr: Cambridge University Press, 1996) at 182 
55Kant, I, ‘On Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives’ in Abbott, T,K, (ed and trans), Kant’s 
Critique of Practical Reason ad Other Works on the Theory of Ethics (Dover Publications,1989) at 36 
56 Strauss, D, A, ‘Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression’ (1991) 91 Columbia LR 334 at 355 
57 Siegler, F, A, ‘Lying’ (1966) 3 American Philosophical Quarterly 128 at 130 
58 Supra n 42 at 77 
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contain the end of this action in himself.’59 Kant’s treatment of the false promisor can be 
equally applied to all forms of deception, including Herring’s example of the rogue who 
falsely proclaims his love,60 to show that deceptions violate autonomy. Autonomy is violated 
because there is lack of reciprocity between the parties.  
S76 and protecting autonomy  
The wording of the Government’s statutory guidance framework on controlling behaviour 
clearly shows that it is designed to cover acts which negatively impact on a person’s 
decision-making process, by influencing their will in a manner which deprives them of 
independence and regulates their behaviour in way which is to the perpetrator’s advantage. 
Since independence is synonymous with freedom, Tadros notes that a ‘particular kind of 
freedom is often undermined by domestic abuse’.61 According to Tadros: 
It is common for victims of domestic abuse to fail to recognise that there 
are options available to them to move from the abusive relationship… the 
wrong done through domestic abuse is not just that the defendant denies 
the victim options, but also that he denies her the freedom to recognise and 
exploit the options that she has.62  
To determine how lying and deceiving restrict a victim’s freedom, the value of autonomy 
needs to be examined. Despite the various conceptions of autonomy,63 the core essence of 
autonomy is the argument that each individual should be able to choose how to live her life, 
                                                     
59 Kant, I, The Moral Law, (H J Paton tr: Hutchinson & Co, 1969) at 4:426 
60 Herring, J, ‘Mistaken Sex’ [2005] Criminal Law Review 511 at 511 
61Tadros, V, ‘The Distinctiveness of Domestic Abuse: A Freedom Based Account’ (2005) Louisiana Law Review 
65(3) 989 at 996  
62Ibid at 999 
63 Dworkin, G, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 
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as long as others are not harmed.64 Autonomy is synonymous with a concept of self-
governance and is characterized by self-sufficiency and independence.65 By viewing 
autonomy as composed of various elements rather than a single entity to choose one’s own 
path, the concept of autonomy applied in this article is one which focuses on securing for 
individuals the right to self-determination. Green adopts a similar approach in relation to 
sexual autonomy where he argues that it is ‘loosely analogous to the concept of property’,66 
which is characterised as a ‘bundle of rights’.67  
According to the principle of individual autonomy, individuals should be treated as 
responsible for their own actions.68 This principle includes factual and normative elements 
which will be explored to determine which elements autonomy should include. The factual 
element of autonomy is that individuals have the capacity and free will to make meaningful 
choices.69  
Under the normative element, individuals should be respected and treated as capable of 
choosing their actions.70 The normative element assists in determining whether a duty exists 
to disclose information which, if withheld, negatively affects the victim’s autonomy by 
depriving her ‘of the means needed for independence’ or regulating her ‘everyday 
behaviour’. Applying Dworkin’s principle that individuals are entitled to equal concern and 
respect,71 allows us to examine the role of the state in relation to protecting individual 
                                                     
64Herring, J, ‘Relational Autonomy and Rape’ in Sclater, S,D, Ebtehaj, F,  Jackson, E, and Richards, M, eds., 
Regulating Autonomy (Hart, 2009) at 54 
65 Fineman, M, ‘The Social Foundations of Law’ (2005) 54 Emory Law Journal 224  
66Becker, L,C, Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations (London: Routledge, 1980), 11-21; Jenner, J,E, ‘The 
"Bundle Of Rights" Picture Of Property’ (1996) 43 UCLA Law Review 711  
67 Supra n 22 at 206 
68 Ashworth, A, and Horder, J, Principles of Criminal Law  (Oxford: OUP, 2009) at 23 
69 Ibid at 23 
70MacCormick, D, N, Legal Rights and Social Democracy: Essays In Legal And Political Philosophy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1982) at 23  
71 Dworkin, R, Taking Rights Seriously (Gerald Duckworth & Co: London 1977) at 180 
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autonomy. Protecting autonomy attaches great importance to ‘liberty and individual rights 
in any discussion of what the State ought to do in a given situation’.72 Thus, the State should 
allow individuals to decide for themselves when and with whom to engage in an intimate 
relationship. 
Autonomy has been described as comprising of two aspects: positive and negative.73 
Positive autonomy involves freedom from restraints and freedom to achieve self-
realisation.74 This is limited in so far as individuals an exercise it provided their freedom does 
not impact on the freedom of others. Thus, in a liberal society significant limitation will be 
placed to ensure that certain rights do not encroach or conflict with the rights of others. 
Negative autonomy, on the other hand, is freedom from interference by external forces.  
While positive autonomy deals with an individual’s right to choose, negative autonomy 
concerns the right to refuse.  
 
Protecting autonomy 
Although lying and deceiving are capable of depriving individuals from the means needed 
for independence and regulating their behaviour, the definitions do not provide a reason as 
to why there should be a duty, in an intimate relationship, for the parties not to lie or 
disclose material information to one another. Kantian ethics will be applied to support the 
argument that individuals, in an intimate relationship, owe a mutual duty of care and 
respect.   
                                                     
72 Supra n 68 at 24 
73Elliott, C, and de Than, C, “The Case for a Rational Reconstruction of Consent in Criminal Law” (2007) 70(2) 
M.L.R. 22, 231 
74Supra n 42 at 207 
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In the context of intimate relationships, controlling behaviour undermines individual 
autonomy by ignoring the duty of respect and care owed to the victim. For Kant, individuals 
deserve respect because they possess ‘autonomy of the will’.75 This concerns an individual’s 
capacity, as a rational being, to choose principles which accord with standards which she 
sets for herself.76 Allowing individuals to exercise their freedom to choose from a set of 
options requires respecting the fact that they are rational beings: 
The respect I have for others or that another can require from me… is 
therefore a recognition of dignity… in other human beings, that is, of a 
worth that has no price, no equivalent for which the object evaluated… 
could be exchanged.77 
Showing respect for individuals requires respecting their autonomy which involves their 
ability shape their lives by making choices, free from external manipulation. Therefore, 
‘autonomy of the will’ is the dignity which each individual possesses and requires respect. 
Lying and deceiving impact on an individual’s autonomy because they limit her ability for 
self-determination.  
Kantian autonomy  
Although autonomy nowadays is associated with individual wishes and desires,78 Kantian 
autonomy is used in this article because ‘[t]o be autonomous…is emphatically not to be able 
to do or have whatever one desire, but rather it is to have the capacity for rational 
                                                     
75 Supra n 29 at  4:440 
76 Hill, T, E, “The Kantian Conception of Autonomy” in Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory 
(Ithica: Cornell University Press 1992), 76-96  
77 Supra n 54 at 6:462 
78 Mclean, S, Autonomy, Consent and the Law (Routledge-Cavendish: Abingdon, 2010) at 14 
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governance’.79 Oshana criticises the Kantian approach for being essentially unhelpful 
because is it ‘premised on a strict adherence to impartial and abstract principles, or a 
conception that discounts the roles that emotion and partiality play in our moral 
development and moral choices, is implausible and unnecessary’.80 Despite, this criticism, 
Kant’s philosophy is ‘manifested in a life in which duties are met, in which there is respect 
for others and their rights, rather than a life liberated from all bonds’.81 It is specifically the 
focus on duties of respect and principles of obligation, which makes Kantian autonomy ideal 
in relation to protecting autonomy in intimate relationships.  
 Kant’s main thesis in the Groundwork is that: 
The moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect expected from it and 
so too does not lie in any principle of action that needs to borrow its 
motives from this expected effect.82 
The moral worth of an act is related to the both the outcome it brings and to whether it is 
carried out as a result of a sense of duty or obligation. Duty is described as ‘the action to 
which someone is bound’.83 All duties, according to Kant, ‘are either duties of right, that is, 
duties for which external law is possible, or duties of virtue, for which external law giving is 
not possible’.84 He divides duties into ‘perfect and imperfect duties’ to ourselves, and 
perfect and imperfect duties to others.85 Although he does not state which particular 
                                                     
79 Downie, R, S, Macnaughton, J, Bioethics and the Humanities: Attitudes and Perceptions (Routledge, 2007) 
80 Oshana, M, ‘The Autonomy Bogeyman’, (2001) The Journal of Value Inquiry  35 209 at 212  
81 O’Neill, O. Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2002) at 83 
82 Supra n 29 at 4:401 
83 Supra n 29 at 4:401 
84 Supra n 54 at 6:239 
85 Supra n 29 at 4:421 
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perfect duty to others he has in mind, Mahon argues that the perfect duty to others he has 
in mind is the perfect duty to others not to lie to others.86  
Lying and deceiving: violation of care 
In addition to respecting the dignity of others as autonomous agents, Kantian ethics 
contains two sets of duties: perfect and imperfect. These involve the duty towards others in 
terms of respect and love.87 Kant’s supreme principle of morality, the Categorical Imperative 
(CI), commands that individuals: 
Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or 
the person of any other, never simply as a means but always at the same 
time as an end.88 
The above formula imposes both negative and positive duties on individuals in relation to 
the treatment of others.89 The negative aspect occurs when we do not interfere with the 
ends of others. Individuals are treated as ends, in the positive sense, when we attempt to 
assist them in attain their (legitimate) ends.90 According to Kant: 
All duties are either ‘duties of right, that is, duties for which external 
lawgiving is possible, or duties of virtue, for which external lawgiving is not 
possible.91 
The CI imposes a moral obligation to respect others. A morally right action is one which 
expresses respect for an individual as an end in herself as opposed to a mere means for the 
                                                     
86 Mahon, J, E, ‘Kant and the Perfect Duty to Others not to Lie’ (2006) British Journal for the History of 
Philosophy 14(4) 653 at 661 
87 Supra n 54 at 6:448 and 6:462 
88 Supra n 29 at 4:429 
89 Cummiskey, D, Kantian Consequentialism, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1996) at 141  
90 Ibid 
91 Supra n 54 at 6:239 
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sole benefit of another. By contrast, a morally wrong action is one which expresses 
disrespect by not valuing the victim as an end in herself.92 The rational nature of individuals 
constitutes the supreme limiting condition of the freedom of action of every human being.93 
The importance of this directive is that it places a limit on the freedom of individuals in 
terms of how they treat others, namely not to treat them only as a means but rather as 
ends in themselves. From the vantage point of pure reason, the CI directs one as to what 
ought to be done in an intimate relationship, and lying and deceiving are contrary to the CI. 
In the context of intimate relationships, individuals must not treat others to further their 
own self-interests but should treat others as beings, worthy of respect and dignity. 
However, it is not wrong to treat individuals as a means to our ends. What is prohibited 
under the CI is treating others as mere means to our ends, to treat them as if the only value 
they have is what derives from their usefulness to us. O’Neill argues that Kant’s requirement 
of treating others as ends in themselves ‘demands that Kantians… act to support the 
possibility of autonomous action where it is most vulnerable’.94 Although O’Neill’s argument 
is in relation to a Kantian duty to work to reduce hunger and poverty, her analysis applies 
equally coercive control in that it concerns owing a duty to assist those who are vulnerable 
(in a controlling environment) or whose autonomy is at risk. Therefore, Kantian ethics 
imposes a duty on individuals to promote the autonomy of others.   
Treating lying and deceiving, in intimate relationships, as a violation of respect, risks missing 
out on another important violation, the duty of care. While it is true the exact component of 
care varies between intimate relationships, a common duty exists in that individuals have a 
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duty to care for and about each other.95 Thus, the importance of the duty of care in intimate 
relationships is that it allows each partner to exercise their autonomy in a manner which is 
consistent with their ends. Care manifests itself as either psychological or practical 
support.96 Psychological support includes providing assurance to one’s partner when she 
has doubts or fears about achieving a particular end, such as feeling isolated from family 
and friends. Supporting another while they are undergoing medical treatment, is an 
example of practical care. Lying and deceiving in an intimate relationship risk depriving the 
victim of the standard of care expected from such a relationship. The perpetrator’s violation 
of the duty of care is inconsistent with Kant’s moral theory, because he has failed to treat 
his victim as an end in herself. Using lying and deceiving also allow the perpetrator to 
exercise control over his victim by limiting the options available to her.     
Applying Kantian ethics to personal relationships, it can be argued that duties in personal 
relationships are different from general duties to others, because respecting autonomy 
might well require we perform some actions for those we know well which we would not 
perform for strangers.97 The formula of humanity (FHE) requires individuals to provide 
special consideration to those in personal relationships because those relationships are ends 
which they have.98 Being in a personal relationship with another usually involves being 
involved in her life plan, therefore, there is a requirement attached to treat her in a way 
that takes those facts into account.  
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Miller argues that through ‘the principle of beneficence, Kant provides the grounds upon 
which to establish that one must respond to the needs of others’.99 In other words, acting in 
a way consistent with care ethic is required by Kantian moral theory. According to Held, care 
involves: 
[A]ttentiveness, sensitivity, and responding to needs. Needs are of 
innumerable subtle emotional and psychological and cultural kinds, as well 
as of completely basic and simple kinds, such as for sufficient calories to 
stay alive. 
Kantian moral theory requires individuals to treat each other in a way that is consistent with 
their relationship and in a way that shows that those individuals consideration. 100 The 
above analysis, can be equally applied to intimate relationships in that individuals are 
required to be attentive to their partners’ needs. Lying and deceiving for the purpose of 
using another individual as a mere means, is clearly inconsistent with Kantian moral theory, 
because the FHE requires individuals to act in a way that promotes the ends of others.  
Kantian autonomy involves care in the treatment of others. Bramer notes that ‘[t]he that 
partners provide to each other allows each partner to exercise his or her autonomy and 
agency’.101  She argues that, understood correctly, Kantian moral theory requires individuals 
to provide special consideration to family and friends.102 The CI in the form of the FHE103 
does not instruct individuals on which action is the right action but rather what kind of 
action is the right action. Thus, by performing an action which shows respect for the agent, 
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individuals are more likely to take into account particular details about that particular 
person.104 Bramer’s analysis can be contrasted with Stark’s interpretation of the FHE. Stark 
claims the impartiality of Kantian theory provides a standard of rightness rather than a way 
to determine which action is right.  
However, while it is true, on Kant’s account, that I must respect others 
because they are rational agents, it does not follow that in respecting them 
I must pay attention only to their rational agency. Indeed, in most cases if 
would be impossible to fulfil one’s obligation to respect someone without 
attending to her particular situation: her needs, concerns, aspirations and 
personal history.105   
It is incorrect to view Kant’s theory of obligations purely based on impartiality which results 
from individuals being rational agents. As noted by Bramer, ‘understood correctly, Kantian 
moral theory not only allows but requires that we give special consideration to family and 
friends.106 This claim is supported by Kant’s claim that: 
For in whishing I can be equally benevolent to everyone, whereas in acting I 
can, without violating the universality of the maxim, vary the degree greatly 
in accordance with the different objects of my love (one of whom concerns 
me more closely than the other).107 
Kant recognises that spouses have obligations to each other due to their relationship. The 
FHE instructs individuals to give special consideration to spouses because of their 
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relationship to us. In his discussion of the FHE, Kant contends that rational nature is an end 
in itself,108 and ends are goals which rational agents set for themselves, which they intent to 
achieve.109  According to Kant, rational beings are ‘objects of respect’110, and therefore, to 
treat a rational agent as an end is to show respect for her capacity to set ends for herself 
and to act on those grounds. Lying and deceiving, when used to manipulate an individual, 
risk treating that individual as a mere means and failing to respect her capacity to set goals 
for herself.  
By ‘humanity’, Kant means the power of free rational choice, for ‘the capacity to propose an 
end to oneself is the characteristic of humanity’.111  The FHE requires that we treat 
humanity as an end and never merely as a means in order to achieve respect for the dignity 
of humanity.  Kant describes an ‘end’ as an object of free choice.112 The words ‘at the same 
time’ and ‘simply’113 must not be overlooked when analysing the meaning of this formula. 
The FHE does not forbid individuals from using others as a means.  For example, every time 
a person borrows a library book, he is using the librarian as a means, but he does not use 
the librarian simply as a means. What he expects from the librarian is in accordance with his 
duty and his own will. What is forbidden by the FHE is failing to treat a person ‘at the same 
time as an end’. This implies that the injunction to treat individuals ‘never merely as a 
means’ is redundant. In order to comply with the FHE, a person must treat others as ends. 
What Kant has in mind when he instructs that a person must never use herself or others 
‘simply as a means’, is that they must not be used as means to the attainment of ends based 
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on inclinations or to the satisfaction of inclinations.114 Showing respect towards others, does 
not merely involve respecting an individual’s ability to set ends for herself and act on those 
principles. Respecting others requires concerns for their physical and emotional 
wellbeing.115   
Lying and deceiving: breach of trust 
O’Neill notes that ‘[t]he advantage of grounding rights in obligations can be secured only if 
good arguments for central human obligations can be found’.116 For Kant, autonomy is a 
matter of acting on principles of obligation.117 O’Neill’s interpretation of Kantian ethics 
combines the notion of autonomy with the notion of trust.118  This approach is capable of 
condemning lying and deceiving because they undermine the trust an individual has placed 
in another. According to O’Neill: 
Kant’s arguments are designed to show that… by establishing that a range 
of very fundamental principles cannot be ‘willed as a universal law’: those 
who adopt them find that they cannot coherently will (even hypothetically) 
that all others adopt the same.119 
This interpretation applies, which applies Kant’s FHE,120 condemns lying and deceiving 
because the perpetrator, in lying about his identity in order to manipulate his victim, treats 
her as a means by limiting restricting her freedom of choice. Boyling’s victim was 
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manipulated into entering in a relationship with him. Kant’s principle of universability 
demands that individuals act only on principles that they can view as principles for all. An 
individual who adopts a principle of control must also will some effective means of 
control.121 Therefore, an individual who wills a principle of control as a universal law must 
also will that everybody uses some form of control. However, it is not possible to adopt a 
universal principle of control because those applying the control are, as Kant points out, 
make an exception for themselves:  
If we now attend to ourselves whenever we transgress a duty we find that 
we do not in fact will that our maxim should become a universal law – some 
this is impossible for us – rather that its opposite should remain a law 
universally: we only take the liberty of making an exception to it for 
ourselves or even just for this once.122   
A commitment to adopting principles that others adopt, rejects lying and deceiving due to 
the fact that it cannot be universalised for all. It follows that any principle of action whose 
universal adoption would undermine capacities for action for some cannot be willed as a 
universal law.123 A second ground for supporting the claim that lying and deceiving negate 
trust, is Kant’s maxim that individuals should never lie, whatever the consequences.  
 
Lying and Deception of undercover police officers 
It has been explained above how a Kantian approach provides a moral framework to 
illustrate that lying and deceiving used within an intimate relationship can be particularly 
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harmful to a person in receipt of the behaviour. Furthermore, Kantian ethics extends 
beyond the individual and imposes an obligation on the State to ensure that autonomy is 
protected within intimate relationships. Before, analysing this aspect of Kantian theory, it is 
useful to provide a contemporary example of lying and deceiving used to create and 
maintain intimate relationships to highlight the involvement of the state. A number of 
undercover-police officers entered into intimate relationships with female members of 
environmental, anarchist and left-wing groups that were listed by the Special 
Demonstration Squad (SDS) as potentially dangerous.124 Exploring the case of AJA & Ors v 
Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis125 illustrates the very real harm felt by the victims 
as a result of both the direct behaviour of the individual officers concerned and the 
endorsement of such behaviour by the state itself. It is contended that were such practices 
to be repeated following the enactment of s. 76 SCA 2015, the officers ought to face 
prosecution. 
 
In AJA & Ors v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, the Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS) halted criminal proceedings against six defendants who had been due to stand trial at 
Nottingham Crown Court on charges related to a conspiracy to sabotage a coal-fired power 
station at Ratcliffe-on-Soar. The CPS was concerned that Nottinghamshire Police had failed 
to comply with their pre-trial disclosure obligations relating mainly to the work of 
undercover police officer, Mark Kennedy.126 It later emerged that PC Kennedy had had at 
least one long-term, intimate sexual relationship with a woman involved with one of the 
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groups he had infiltrated. Following this discovery, allegations concerning undercover police 
officers acting beyond their authorisation, or taking action which was authorised but should 
not have been, were reported in the media.127 It was claimed that several officers had 
intimate relationships with members of the groups they had infiltrated. An investigation by 
the Guardian shed light on the conduct of other undercover police officers such as Andre 
James Boyling,128 Mark Jenner129 and Bob Lambert.130 In December 2011 eight women 
launched legal action against the Metropolitan Police for the harm caused by undercover 
officers deceiving them into long term intimate relationships. The victims claimed that the 
undercover police officers breached their human rights, subjecting them to inhumane and 
degrading treatment,131 and disrespecting their private and family life.132 The women also 
brought claims for deceit, assault, misfeasance in public office and negligence.  
In February 2013, the Home Affairs Committee invited the women involved to give 
evidence. One witness explained that:  
How it feels to me is that it is not having found out that your partner was 
lying about who they are; it is finding out that your most personal 
relationship was being controlled by the state without your knowledge.133 
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Another woman who had a child with an undercover police officer stated, ‘We are 
psychologically damaged; it is like being raped by the state. We feel that we were sexually 
abused because none of us gave consent.’134 It is clear that the victims would not have 
engaged in intimate relationships with the undercover police officers had they known their 
true identities.135 In terms of emotional attachment, Kennedy’s conduct appears, to be 
different to that of Boyling, Jenner and Lambert. These men developed a long-term 
relationship with the female activists they were assigned to spy on. Jenner cohabited with 
his partner for a period of five years, while Lambert had a child with his victim. With regards 
to Boyling, he married the activist and had two children with her. 
In relation to criminal proceedings, the CPS considered whether there was sufficient 
evidence to allow charges of rape, indecent assault, procuring a woman to have sexual 
intercourse by false pretences, misconduct in public office and breaches of the Official 
Secrets Act. On 21st August 2014, the CPS confirmed that: 
Having carefully considered all the available evidence, provided at the end 
of a thorough investigation, we have determined that there is insufficient 
evidence for a realistic prospect of conviction for any offences against any 
of the officers. Investigators from Operation Aubusson have confirmed that 
no further lines of enquiry are available at this time.136 
On the 20th November 2015, the Metropolitan Police gave a full apology, conceding that 
they had abused the women’s human rights, as part of a settlement: 
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[I]t has become apparent that some officers, acting undercover whilst 
seeking to infiltrate protest groups, entered into long-term intimate sexual 
relationships with women which were abusive, deceitful, manipulative and 
wrong.137 
The behaviour acknowledged would therefore amount to continuous lying and deceiving, 
which has been argued above to amount to controlling behaviour. The victim’s evidence 
clearly illustrates that the deception and lying adversely affected their daily lives, 
undermining their autonomy. Bok argues that victims ‘who learn that they have been lied to 
in an important matter – say, the identity of their parents, the affection of their spouse, or 
the integrity of their government – are resentful, disappointed, and suspicious’. She 
contends that victims ‘feel wronged’ and ‘see that they were manipulated, that the deceit  
made them unable to make choices for themselves according to the most adequate 
information available, unable to act as they would have wanted to act had they known all 
along’.138 Thus, when a deception is successful, it can provide power to the deceiver, and 
therefore, can be coercive.139 The power afforded to the deceiver is the ability to control his 
victim and limit her freedom to make choices according to her own standards. It is this 
erosion of the victim's freedom which is significant because it takes place through the 
violation of an expectation of trust.140  
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Lying and deceiving: violation dignity  
Boyling, Jennings and Lambert engaged in long term relationships with their victims, 
therefore, the deception carried out had the effect of controlling their victims’ behaviour 
over a period of time. It is submitted that the impact on their victims’ autonomy is much 
greater than, for example, Kennedy’s victims who were deceived into a brief sexual 
encounter.141 The harm to autonomy in an intimate relationship is greater because the 
victim makes choices, not just in relation to sex, about her life which are influenced by the 
D’s lies and deception. Given the fact that the victims were deceived over an extended 
period of time, and these relationships involved more than simply casual sex, their 
autonomous choice was incapacitated even more than a casual sexual encounter.  
Denial of a victim’s dignity and limiting her choices by controlling her behaviour is evidence 
that the perpetrator is shaping the victim’s life choices in a manner which might not be 
consistent with her own principles. Lying and deceiving could be used in an intimate 
relationship to shape the victim into what the perpetrator wants. 
The deception carried out by Boyling and Lambert influenced their victims into entering into 
relationships and having children with them, when evidence indicates that they would not 
have done so had it not been for the deception. For Kant, ‘ends’ are goals we set ourselves, 
and ‘means’ are what individuals use to achieve those ‘ends’.142 Lying and deceiving allow 
the perpetrator to violate her autonomy by denying that she is an end in herself worthy of 
respect and has dignity. The victims under consideration were deceived into entering into 
long terms relationships in order for the undercover officers to continue to spy on the 
activists. Boyling’s deception interfered with his victim’s ends (negative duty), because his 
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actions impacted on her freedom by manipulating her choice to enter and remain in an 
intimate relationship with him.143 His conduct also failed to assist her in attaining her ends, 
because she falsely believed that he was a fellow activist. His lack of respect for his victim is 
evidenced by his sudden disappearance. It cannot be said that the victims were treated ‘at 
the same time as an end’. They were clearly deceived into entering into relationships to 
further the purpose of the undercover officers. It is clear that Boying’s deception had a 
profound effect on his victims wellbeing, which made her feel ‘like a prostitute; just an 
unknowing and unpaid one’.144 
 
Protecting autonomy: Obligations of the Kantian State  
 
Further to the behaviour employed by the undercover officers towards the victims in order 
to advance their criminal investigations is the apparent endorsement by the state that they 
received. An example of the encouragement given to the officers by the authorities, include 
instructions they received to ‘try to have fleeting, disastrous relationships’ with group 
members.145 This addition of state involvement appears to have added substantially to the 
distress of the victims, illustrated by the quotations above. This section will consider State 
obligations owed to citizens under a Kantian theory.  
A tradition in political philosophy endorses certain lies for the sake of the public good. Plato, 
for example, used the expression ‘noble lies’ to describe the story that might be told to 
citizens to persuade them to accept class distinction and, thereby, safeguard social 
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harmony.146 Bok, argues that ‘very special safeguards’ are required whenever lies to the 
public become routine.147 If it is to be argued that those in government and other positions 
of trust, such as the police, should be held to the highest standards, the question is what 
moral framework should be adopted which places a moral obligation on the State to 
safeguard  victims from deceptive conduct. Such a framework also has to limit the 
perpetrator’s positive autonomy whenever his lying or deceiving risks impacting on his 
victim’s negative autonomy. In other words, his lying or deceiving amounts to controlling 
behaviour because they subvert the autonomy his victim and reduce her agency. Thus, 
social policy needs to contribute to women’s self-sufficiency, rather than undermine it.148  
A Kantian framework is used in this article because it can be applied beyond the individual 
level. The Categorical Imperative (CI) in the Formula of Humanity (FHE) requires individuals 
to act in a way that treats humanity at the same time as an end and never simply as a 
means. An examination of Kant’s Doctrine of Right will assist in shedding light on the duties 
and responsibilities of the State in protecting the autonomy of its citizens. In his discussion 
on the general division of duties of right, Kant lists three duties. The first duty requires 
individual’s to assert their worth in relation to others.149 The second duty commands not to 
wrong others even if this would require ceasing to associate with others and ‘shun all 
society’.150 The third duty, ‘(If you cannot help associating with them) enter into a society 
with them in which each can eek what is his’, is linked to the second duty in which ‘what 
                                                     
146 Plato, The Republic, edited by Waterfield, R, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2008), 389b 
147 Supra n 138 at 181 
148 Johnson. M,P, and Leone, J,M, ‘The Differential Effects of Intimate Terrorism and Situational Couple 
Violence: Findings from the National Violence Against Women Survey’ International Conference on Personal 
Relationships, Brisbane, Australia, July 2000 available at 
   http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/m/p/mpj/JFI03.html  
149 Supra n 54 at 6:236 
150 Ibid at 6:236 
 31 
 
belongs to each can be secured to him against everyone else’.151 Although this may appear 
to require the State to only protect property, given the phrase ‘what belongs to each’, it can 
also be understood as a duty to join with others to create a society to secure just treatment 
for all.152 If the current law is to incorporate a Kantian requirement that each individual 
should be treated as an end in herself, s76 must reflect the fact that lying and deceiving are 
capable of undermining autonomy and by virtue of them being tools for treating victims as 
mere means.  
In his discussion on role of the State, Kant wrote: 
The sum of the laws which need to be promulgated in order to bring about 
a rightful condition is public right. – Public right is therefore a system of law 
for a people, that is, a multitude of human beings…which, because they 
affect one another, need a rightful condition under a will uniting them...so 
that they may enjoy what is laid down as right.153 
Bramer adopts a Kantian approach regarding the duties of a State to ‘secure just treatment 
for everyone’.154 The purpose of the State, according to the above quote, is to provide laws 
which will establish and maintain a ‘rightful condition’ to govern how individuals treat each 
other. A right, according to the ‘Universal Principle of Right’ is, ‘[a]ny action…if it can coexist 
with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law’.155 Thus, all actions are right 
provided they coexist with the freedom of all individuals. The importance of the universal 
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principle of right is that it secures humanity’s sole innate right: the right to freedom.156 In 
other words, individuals are free to act in any way they see fit, provided their actions do not 
interfere with the freedom of others. Kant defines an innate right ‘[f]reedom (independence 
from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of 
every other in accordance with a universal law’.157 Lying and deceiving, therefore, are 
morally wrong because they allow the perpetrator to interfere with the freedom of another.  
Since lying and deceiving negatively impact on the freedom of another, the State, which 
exists to maximise individual freedom, can use coercion as a means to limit the freedom of 
perpetrators under certain conditions. According to Kant: 
[I]f a certain use of freedom is itself a hindrance to freedom in accordance 
with universal laws (i.e., wrong), coercion that is opposed to this (as a 
hindering of a hindrance to freedom) is consistent with freedom in 
accordance with universal laws, that is, it is right.158 
The above imposes an obligation on the state to make laws which limit a perpetrator’s 
freedom to lie or deceive, as long as the purpose of those laws is to promote freedom 
generally.159 The undercover officers engaged in lying and deceiving which affected the 
freedom of their victims. A Kantian framework provides a justification for the state to enact 
laws against conduct, such as lying and deceiving, which allows perpetrators to negatively 
affect the freedom of others.    
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Objections to Kantian autonomy 
Kantian autonomy has become associated with a:  
[M]oral superstar alone on a rock of rational will power, removed from the 
individuals whose this will requires him (Kant’s hero is clearly conceived as 
male by Kant himself) to respect, relying on himself, with no “taint” of love 
or emotion spoiling his moral glory.160 
This criticism is aimed at Kant’s view that an individual should be able to stand alone and be 
independent of determination of ‘alien causes’ and possessing a will that is a ‘law to 
itself’.161  Kant’s moral individual is said to be devoid of compassion but committed to 
principles and the duties that stem therefrom.162 This depiction of the autonomous 
individual is unappealing to feminists who see an important place for care and sympathy in 
the nature of moral character.163 Kantian autonomy is often viewed by feminists to be a 
thoroughly masculinist ideal on the basis that it is premised on an ‘abstract individualism 
that portrays the paradigm moral agent as isolated, nonsensical, and ahistorical’.164  
It is submitted that Kant’s remarks in relation to sex, marriage and prostitution are often 
ridiculed165 and to some extent this is a stance well-justified, given Kant’s prudish and 
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misogynist views. However, his arguments to support the limited circumstances in which he 
believed sex to be morally permissible contain a strong egalitarian and contractual bend and 
insist on a strong normative standard of “symmetry” between the two partners concerning 
the “use” of the other’s body.166 Thus, while Kant’s views on marriage are conservative, his 
analysis of the permissibility of marital sex allows for protecting autonomy where lying or 
deception is used to manipulate another. Since morality is linked to rationality, individuals 
lose moral worth when lust dictates their choices. Matrimony, according to Kantian ethics, is 
permissible because it involves the parties granting reciprocal rights over each other.167 It 
allows for reciprocal possession of their sexual faculties, ‘each of them undertaking to 
surrender the whole of their person to the other with a complete right to disposal over 
it’.168 Thus, within marriage, individuals are not using each other merely as a means to an 
end, but are doing so in a broader context of mutual respect. Marital sex takes place within 
a broader context of individuals freely engaging in a lifelong contractual venture. Marriage 
places the parties on an equal footing. It is this commitment to mutual reciprocity which 
should be applied in the context of protecting autonomy in intimate relationships.  
 
Conclusion  
This article has argued that lying and deceiving should be included within the typology of 
abuse in intimate relationships. Lying and deceiving involves violations of autonomy 
because they negatively impact on a victim’s freedom by limiting her choices. They can be 
accommodated within the non-exhaustive list, published in the Government’s Statutory 
                                                     
166 For Kant, of course, it must be two heterosexual individuals only. 
167 Kant, I, ‘The Philosophy of Law’, translated by W. Hastie, in Morality and Moral Controversies, (3rd ed) ed by 
Arthur, J, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1993) at 255 
168 Ibid at 255 
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Guidance Framework, which includes the types of behaviours associated with coercion and 
control. Adopting a Kantian framework, at both the individual and state levels, allows for 
such conduct to be criminalised under s. 76. Although the current Statutory Framework 
does not include lying and deceiving as conduct which is explicitly associated with control, 
the typology of abuse can be expanded to include lying and deceiving through Kant’s 
Categorical Imperative (CI). The CI imposes an obligation on individuals to treat others 
always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means. For Kant, lying and 
deceiving are wrong because they cannot be applied universally. Moreover, Kantian ethics 
allows the state to restrict the freedom of a perpetrator who uses lying or deception to 
control his partner because his conduct would negatively impact on her autonomy. The 
State must, therefore, limit a perpetrator’s autonomy, by virtue of s. 76, in cases where his 
lying or deceiving restricts the freedom of another, in an intimate relationship. Future courts 
must recognise this form of controlling behaviour in order to safeguard the autonomy of 
victims.    
 
 
 
 
